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ECO~O:HC ISSUES OF GROU~D:-.',\TER NANAGEt-1E~T

B. Delworth Gardner **
Director of Giannini Foundation, U.C. Berkeley and Davis
and Professor of Agricultural Economics, U.C. Davis
Introduction
This is a coaceptual rather than an empirical paper with the primary
focus on raising a set of economic issues faced by any authority charged
with managing a groundwater aquifer.

I will utilize the technique of

making simplifying, albeit unrealistic, assumptions in order to establish
easily and clearly the relevant economic principles.

Some of the assump-

tions will be relaxed later to achieve greater realism.

It is assumed

that the hydrologic dimensions of the groundwater system are known and
that the management authority has the power to enforce whatever rules it
deems appropriate.

There are a host of problems associated with both of

these assumptions, but their discussion is beyond the scope of this
brief paper.

Once the principles of optimum use of the aquifer have

been discussed, the paper will close with some probable reasons why
groundwater aquifers in California are not utilized at this economically
optimal level.
Definitions and Management Goals
In order that we might proceed somewhat rigorously, let us postulate a simplified real-world situation where the ultimate use of groundwater is for irrigation of agricultural crops, and the aquifer is being

*Paper delivered at Twelfth Biennial Conference on Groundwater,
Sacramento, California, September 20-21, 1979.
**Carole Nuckton and Richard V. Howitt read the paper and made useful
suggestions that the author incorporated in large measure.
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used exclusively by a single farmer.

Let us also assume that the cost

of utilizing groundwater is knmm ~vith certainty and is the sum of the
costs of pumping the water to the surface, conveying it to the point of
application, and applying it to the crop to be irrigated.

For simplicity,

assuQe that the short-run per unit costs of power, pumps, pipes, etc.,
and the per unit costs of installing irrigation technology needed for
obtaining and distributing the water supply are a constant £unction of
the quantity cf water utilized.

Also, assume that there are no economies

of size in water supply if larger systems are installed and that "'ater
quality will not vary with the rate of pumpage.

So long as the irrigator's

pumping does not reduce the water table, increasing the depth of pumping,
the per unit costs will be constant.

Thus, as a function of the araount

of wa~er used per unit time, the total cost of water (TC) can be graphed
as in Figure 1.

TC is linear and its slope is the average and marginal

cost.
As the law of variable proportions (diminishing returns) suggests,
the per unit value of water to the irrigator will most likely be a
declining function of the amount used per unit time--that is, as greater
quantities of water are applied to a fixed land base> the increments in
crop yields are expected to decline sooner or later.

Aassuming that

farmers are price takers with respect to the crops they sell, this
suggests a total value function for water (TV) that increases at a
diminishing rate and eventually declines if so much water is applied
that crop yields decline (s·e'e Figure 1).

Initially, let us also assu;ne

that possibilities for recharging the aquifer are such that TV is capable
of being maintained through time.
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FIGURE 1

Value and Cost of Irrigation Hater and the Optimum Quantity of Use
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Rent (R) represents the difference between TV and TC (Figure 1) or
the difference between what water is worth and what it costs.

Under

these conditions, the amount of water a f arrc1er would choose to use will
depend on the criteria of use guiding him.

A reasonable rule of use is

that the fanner will take from the aquifer that quantity of water such
that R is as great as possible--the surplus of value over cost is at a
maxirnu~ (at quantity 04m in Figure 1).

Quantities of water smaller than

0~ yield greater marginal values than marginal costs--that is, the TV
function is steeper than the TC function--so that rent could be increased
by expanding water use.
Thus, Oq

m

The reverse is true at quantities greater than

is a true static equilibriui!l where R is maximized per

unit time.
So far so good.

But there is a complication that muddies the water

(figuratively, of course).

Groundwater is not a flow resource that is

lost to our hypothetical farmer if it is not used as is surface water in
streams and rivers.

Rather, it is a stock resource which if unused this

year will be available for use next year, providing of course that
storage capacity exists in the aquifer.

Given this added intertemporal

dimension of the allocation problem, it is not sufficient to show that
Oq

m

quantity of water is the optimum annual amount .to use.

Perhaps

yields, prices, costs, etc. will change through time in such a ·way that
rents from water use in the future will be greater than they are in the
present year.
Oq

m

If so, it would be unprofitable over the long term to use

units of water this year; some of it should be saved and used in the

future when expected rents will be even greater.
The present value of the future rent of water foregone by using it
in the present period is termed "user cost."

There is a user cost for

r

-5-

each future time period.

The rule for optimum intertemporal water alloca-

tion is to equate user costs in each time period so that the present value
of each expected future rent is equal to the rent in the current year.
Mathematically, this is achieved when R

0

= R1
(l+i)

=
1

R

2

(l+i)

=
2

R

n
(l+:L)n

where the R's are the rents in the various years from year o to yearn
and i is the relevant rate of discount.

This rule maximizes the net

worth of the existing stock of water, and seems to be an attractive one
for any water management agency to follow if it desires to allocate
water through time at maximum efficiency.
The Com..--non Property Problem and Aquifer Management
It should be obvious from the above that even under the stringent
assumption of single-farmer ownership, the optimal rate of utilization
of the aquifer, year by year, will depend on the hydrologic properties
of the aquifer (storage capacity, rate of recharge, water quality,
etc.), expected crop yields, prices and costs affec.ting annual rents,
and the expected rate of interest.

My colleague, Professor R. Howitt,

has discussed this point in some detail in an earlier paper at this
conference.
In the real world, of course, underground water aquifers are generally
not the property of a single irrigator to use as he wishes.

That is,

they are not "owned" by anyone but are utilized by a number of overlying
land owners who compete for the water in the aquifer.

Unless the aquifer

is very large compared to the use made of it, or the recharge (eeps it
full, one farmer's pumping will tak~ water that will no longer be available to another pumper.

Moreover, the reduced quantity of water remaining
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in the aquifer will be available only at greater depths.

In addition,

it may well be true that the water left in the aquifer will be of lower
quality as water use increases the salt concentration in the remaining
water.

Thus, farmer A's pumping activity will increase the cost of

water for all the others.

Economists call this interdependency of

resource use in which common access to the resource is unrestricted, th,
common-property resource problem.
Let us see how the common-property problem changes the condition_s
of optimal groundwater allocation.

Consider a set of irrigators who are

assumed. to be homogeneous in their valuations of water and in their
costs of utilizing it.

This common water valuation for the average

prospective user for alternative quantities is represented as function

TVP or total value product in Figure 2.

In the absence of external

costs imposed on each other because of the common-property problem, the
common cost curve for all would be TPC (total private cost).

Again, the

assumption is made that it is the perception of each farmer that his own
use of water will have an imperceptible effect on his own future per
. costs o f pumping..
1/
unit
Since, however, there are cost-increasing effects of the puraping of
each irrigator on other users of the common-property resource, the
actual cost curve will be higher than TPC.

The total social cost curve

(TSC) in Figure 2 is a function reflecting this higher cost, and the
difference between TSC and TPC is the increment in cost resulting from
the co~on-property ~xternality.

!/

The magnitude of this difference will

I: this assumption were violated the situation would be slightly
different. If farmer A's current pumping were perceived to increase
his future avert,ge and marginal costs of utilizing water from the
aquifer, then TPC in Figure 2 would not be linear but ,wuld increase
at an increasinc rate.
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FIGURE 2
Water Valuation, Costs, and Rents Under Common-Property Pumping Conditions
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depend largely on tl1c rate of pumping compared to the size of the aquifer;
if tl1e rate is large, the drawdown will be rapid and the external costs
will be high.
·what arc the implications of the common-property problem for management of the aquifer?

The per unit rent from using the resource (ab in

Figure 2) is the difference between TVP and TSC and will be at a maxirnuc1
when:! the slopes of these curves are equal.
thus Oq
Oq

0

0

The optimal use of water is

units of water pumped per unit time.

Expansion of use beyond

will increase the costs of use more than the water is worth and so

would be economically inefficient.

A monopolist who owned the aquifer

or a management entity who operated it in the best interest of the joint
pumpers would regulate use so that only Oq

0

units could be pumped.

In

the common-property situation, however, without property rights to restrict pumping to Oq
of ab at Oq

0

0

units of water, each pumper would capture a rent

level of use.

He would have no way of protecting this

rent from the competition of other pumpers, who also could capture part
of it by pumping.

In other words, each pumper will realize that other

pumpers will continue to pump so long as any rent is available; if one
is to share in capturing these rents, he must do as each of the others.
The result would be continued pumping until the rents are completely
dissipated at Oq e level of use where water per
se has no net economic
--value--i.e., the costs of making it available are exactly equal to its
value.
We can now begin to see the dilemrrra faced by California irrigators
taking water from a common-property groundwater aquifer.

If the no-

restriction situation is allowed to continue, and no replacement water
is available, pumping will continue until the water rent reaches zero.
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This may r e quire s e ve ral y ea rs to acco mplish, but without some control
of wa ter use this result is in evitabl e .
Since farms are not homogeneous as earlier a s sumed, their abili~ies
to earn water rents will vary and the better -than-average farmers may
cont i nue to earn some water rents even at the no-rent equilibrium for
the average.

Even for these farmers, however, the equilibrium situation

is probably not so profitable as is the social optimum where rent is at
a maximum.

Not only are annual incoraes reduced, but substantial losses

in wealth may be borne, for land prices in irrigated areas are determined
largely by rents earned as water is applied to the land.

Thus, if no

rent is earned by water, land prices could be expected to fall to the
level established for nonirrigated land.

The difference between land

prices at the maximum-rent level of water use and the no-rent level
would undoubtedly be very large, probably an order of magnitude (10 times)
as large.
Given these consequences of unrestricted pumping, one might e xpect
farmers to be in the vanguard of those demanding that pumping be controlled, but, in fact, irrigator groups appear to be the principal
opponents of restrictions on pumping.
significant reasons:

Why?

There seem to be five

(1) Farmers realize that ma ny aquifers are presently

being underutilized, not overutilized; (2) Other factors are keeping
water rents up despite lm,ering water tables, so tha t the overuse proble m
is not y e t v ery visible; (3) A widespread distrust of the proposed
regulation machinery exists, especially if control passes to the state
lev el; (lf) There is an unwillingness to give up the rents associated
with moving to the equilibrium level of water use since this may require
irrigated land retirement; and (5) A belief prevails that the political
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process will ultimately delive r ne\1 replacement water for the d e pleted
grounduater.

Let us discu ss thes e points in turn.
Barriers to Eff e ctive Groundwater Control

Groundwater aquifers vary enormously in. their size, depth, access:i.bility, recharge potential, and in the value of the water they contain.
Some aquifers have been inten s ively studied, some hardly at all.

The

Yolo County aquifer has recently been ~odeled,1/ both hydrologically and
economically.

A linear program.ming model was used to estimate the

values of water in agricultural uses in six water sub-basins in the
county, and an optimal control technique was utilized to estimate user
costs of foregone future uses.

The study revealed that four of the six

sub-basins actually used less groundwater in the study year (1975) than
was economically optimal.

In other words, the groundwater tables were

actually higher than the level where water rents would be a maximum.

A

shift in aquifer use from the future toward the present would have
increased the sum of the present values of future water rents • . The
reason that groundwater was underutilized in these sub,-basins is not
clear.
at

11

Perhaps surface water was sufficiently plentiful and available

low11 prices and farmers simply underestimated the current value of

the groundwater compar ed to its future value.

Alternatively, perhaps

the optimal-control model undervalued the stored water as a · contingency
stock available for future use in the event of drought and/or other
shifts in the economy that -~•muld drive up future water rents.
In one of the st1b-basins ground.water

l•:as

ove rutiliz ed in the present

and in one. the rate of pr es ent use wa s approximately optimal.

2/

In his

Noel, J. C., "Dynamic \-rater Management: An Optimal Control Approach,''
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis, 1979.
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paper, Professor lloul.tt has presented empirical information on other
aquifers, showing that some of them are much more heavily utilized than
others .

No doubt the com.11on-property problem is serious in sor;ie places.

In any .case, it is quite obvious that farmers cannot easily be convinced
that groundwater pumping restrictions need to be imposed if they believe
that the aquifer is being presently utilized far below the socially
optimal level.

This point does not negate the desirability of controlling

the use of those aquifers that are being overutilized, of course.

What

is implied by this discussion is the management flexibility to impose
controls only where needed and to permit only those significantly
affected by the controls to participate in the decision of whether or
not to control.
A second reason that farmers may oppose control is that factors
other than the corrnnon-property problem could be operating to increase
rents through time.

A multitude of forces can change costs and prices

and thereby change rents.

Some of the important ones are:

cost-reducing

technical advance, economies of scale, expansion of demand especially
through foreign trade, reduction of relative fertilizer and other input
prices, and large investment in capital equipment driving up the marginal
productivity of land and water.

Analytically, these factors will affect

the TVP and TSC curves in Figure 2 and cause the optimal use of water
quantity Oq

0

to shift around.

problem to establish where Oq

m1at is at issue here is an estimation
0

is as the TVP and TSC curves shift.

Thus, through time, rents may be increasing because of shifting TVP and
TSC curves) but could be even highe~ if the optimal quantity of water
were utilized.

Estimation of the socially optimum water quantity in the

face of changing circumstances is an important issue for any management

-12-

agency to resolve in a way cred i bl e to the wat er u seTs ,

Certa i nly sorae

kind of dyna mic mod eling effort is need ed to monitor the significant
changes in TVP and TSC that occur through time.
A third reason for farmer opposition to groundwat e r control is the
fear that groundwater use decisions will pass from farmers to nonfarmers.
Even thoL1gh water raay be becoming increasingly costly to utilize as
water tables decline, the present no-control situation at least permits
farmers to take the amount of water they think they need.

So long as

rents are positive, irrigators are understandably reluctant to put their
economic destinies in the hands . of a control agency, particularly one
lodged in Sacramento.

Farmers, like nearly everybody else, understand

the competing demands for scarce water supplies.

They also realize that

their political muscle is significantly diminished as farm numbers
decline and numbers of urban wafer users, recreationists, and industrial
users grow.

Agricultural users are, therefore, highly suspicious that

restrictions on pumping would provide the control agency with an opportunity, under heavy pressure from competing groups, to shift the groundwater to other users.

Even an anemic bird in the hand may be worth more

than two healthy ones in the bush~ for the latter may fly away.

Ever

diminis hing water rents from common-pool pumping may be preferable to no
rents at all.

It is ironic that more groundwater mining occurs in

California and Texas than in all other states, yet these are two states
which have not enacted groundwater control statutes.
Two minimal prerequisites for groundwater organization and uanag2ment would be conducive to irrigator: support of punping controls:
(1) The b;undaries of the politica l control agency should correspond as
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closely as possible with the boundaries of the underlying aquifer, and
(2) The personnel imposing the controls should be elected representatives of the water users.
A fourth factor explaining irrigator resistance to controls is
closely related to the previous one.

Diminished pumping means that

present rents have to be foregone in order to increase future rents.

It

is quite possible that irrigated acreage tmuld have to be contracted if
current water pumping were reduced.

Then, significant wealth losses

would occur as land values would drop when rents decline in response to
water removal.

Still, if water reductions were made on a per acre

irrigated basis at least the wealth losses would be proportional to
acreage; and if water remaining in the aquifer were used for future
irrigation, the long-range wealth impacts of pumping control would be
favorable.

Reducing pumping to the optimal level would maximize water

rents over the long term, the net worth of the water in the ground, -and
the land values on the surface.

Even in the short run, some of the

negative impacts of pumping reductions probably could be mitigated by
feasible investment in water-saving irrigation technology.
Finally, many irrigators believe that even if common-pool pumping
continued, the point of rent exhaustion will never become a reality
because newly developed replacement water will become available before
the situation becomes critical.
view.

History tends to confirm this point of

Big brotherly government has been anxious to rescue those in

distress.

At the state and local level, politicians are motivated to

protect the economic base of the cormnunity, especially if protection
come s in federal subsidies in the forn of "low" water _prices or costsharing of water-saving technology.

Powerful state and federal water
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agencies are eager allies to irrigators, for they thrive on expansion of
budzets aud influence.

But, on the other hand, the political environ-

mcmt today :is not what it used to be.

Government agencies are being

pressured to avoid ·wasteful expenditures by other agencies with a "watchdog"
role; other interest groups have designs on water ·which they perceive

2s

being inefficiently used in agriculture; and conservationists and
environmentalists are blocking new water development in all ways they
can with a ferocity not earlier experienced in our history.

It is by no

means clear that significant new water development will be available to
bail out users of depleted groundwater basins.

